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In this paper, I will try to show that the idea that there can be consciousness without some
form of attention, and high-level top-down attention without consciousness, originates
from a failure to notice the varieties of forms that top-down attention and consciousness
can assume. I will present evidence that: there are various forms of attention and con-
sciousness; not all forms of attention produce the same kind of consciousness; not all
forms of consciousness are produced by the same kind of attention; there can be low-level
attention (or preliminary attention), whether of an endogenous or exogenous kind, without
consciousness; attention cannot be considered the same thing as consciousness.
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INTRODUCTION
In the controversial and unresolved debate about the relation-
ship between attention and consciousness, Koch and Tsuchiya’s
(2006) article certainly had the merit of posing the problem of the
relationship between attention and consciousness in a very clear,
schematic, and provocative way. They maintained that top-down
attention and consciousness are distinct phenomena that need not
occur together, and presented evidence that all the following four
cases are possible:
(1) top-down attention with consciousness
(2) top-down attention without consciousness
(3) consciousness without top-down attention
(4) no top-down attention – no consciousness
Albeit focused on a speciﬁc kind of attention, that is, top-down
attention, this fourfold classiﬁcation offers an ideal comprehensive
framework that can be generalized in order to study the possible
relationships between all forms of consciousness and attention.
I will try to show here that, even if attention cannot be con-
sidered the same thing as consciousness, some form of attention
is always necessary for consciousness, and that high-level top-
down attention always implies some form of consciousness (or
alternatively, that there can be low-level attention or preliminary
attention, whether of an exogenous or endogenous kind, with-
out consciousness). More in general, I will also present evidence
that: there are various forms of attention and consciousness; not all
forms of attention produce the same kind of consciousness; not all
formsof consciousness are producedby the samekindof attention.
POSITIVE EVIDENCE OF THE CLOSE CORRELATION BETWEEN
ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS
The idea that attention is strictly linked to consciousness is not
new (James, 1890; Posner, 1994; O’Regan and Noë, 2001). Indeed,
the idea is quite intuitive, if we consider what is thought to be one
of the main characteristics of attention: its selective power. When
we attend to a certain object or part of an object, we are able to
isolate it from the other objects or parts, so that our conscious
mind is completely and exclusively possessed and “ﬁlled” by it (La
Berge, 1995). Even though this does not prove that attention is
necessary or sufﬁcient for consciousness, it shows that there is a
direct connection between attention and consciousness: how we
pay attention to the world is highly correlated with how the world
appears to us. Moreover, well-known psychological phenomena
demonstrate that attention modulates perception, directly inﬂu-
encing the way we consciously experience the world. Let’s consider
some evidence from psychological studies. These examples of a
tight correlation between attention and consciousness should be
taken into account for a possible falsiﬁcation by all those who
maintain that attention and consciousness are fully dissociable.
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF VISUAL PERCEPTION
Carrasco’s (2011) work provides empirical evidence that atten-
tion alters phenomenal appearance: it boosts the apparent stim-
ulus contrast. For example, Liu et al.’s (2009) study shows that
voluntary (endogenous, sustained) covert spatial attention alters
the appearance of objects. In this study, which provides a phe-
nomenological correlate of the effect of voluntary attention on
perception, voluntary attention increases the perceived contrast
of suprathreshold stimuli: attending to a peripheral location
makes a cued 29%-contrast stimulus and an uncued 36%-contrast
stimulus both subjectively equivalent to a 32%-contrast stimulus.
Likewise, Carrasco et al. (2004) show that when the transient
covert attention (which is the stimulus-driven, exogenous, invol-
untary capture of attention by an abrupt, salient peripheral cue)
of observers is drawn to a suprathreshold stimulus via a periph-
eral cue, they report this stimulus as being higher in contrast than
it really is, thus indicating a change in appearance with attention
(however, it should be noted that this work was not free of contro-
versies: see Schneider, 2006; Prinzmetal et al., 2008; Schneider and
Komlos, 2008. For the answer, see Carrasco et al., 2008; Carrasco,
2011).
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF THE PERCEPTION OF TIME
Important evidence that attention modulates perception also
comes from the domain of the studies of time perception. The
phenomenon of prior-entry, for example, shows that when a per-
son attends to a stimulus, he or she perceives it as having occurred
earlier in time than if he or she was not attending to it (Shore et al.,
2001). Experiments on duration judgments in which subjects are
asked to prospectively judge the duration of the time period they
have to perform a certain task, reveal that judged time decreases
linearly with the increased processing demands of non-durational
information, and that experienced duration increases to the extent
that subjects can allocate more attentional resources to the ﬂow of
time itself (Hicks et al., 1976,1977; Brown,1985;Coull et al., 2004).
In short, a higher amount of attention allocated to the passage of
time itself produces a lengthening of the experienced duration.
A similar attentional effect results when attention is directed in
advance to one of two possible stimulus sources:Mattes andUlrich
(1998) show that subjects judge a stimulus as being longer when
it appears at the precued stimulus source than when it appears at
the uncued one; that is, directed attention prolongs the perceived
duration of a stimulus.
INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS (IB) AND CHANGE-BLINDNESS
The idea that attention is necessary for consciousness has received
strong support from the work of Mack and Rock (1998) and
Rensink et al. (1997). In Mack and Rock’s (1998) experiments,
the subject’s attention was engaged in a task (such as identifying
the longer arm of a cross brieﬂy presented on the screen and cen-
tered at about 2˚ from ﬁxation). After some trials, an unexpected,
unsearched critical stimulus (for example, a black circle) was pre-
sented at ﬁxation, and subjects were asked whether they had seen
anything that had not been on the screen in the earlier trials.
Between 60 and 80% of the subjects failed to detect the critical
stimulus. A comparison between reports of the critical stimulus
in the inattention, critical trials (where subjects were told to pay
attention to the cross, but were not told that a critical stimulus
would appear) and those in full attention control trials (where
subjects were told to ignore the cross, and to report only what else
they saw on the screen when the cross was present), conﬁrmed that
focal attention is clearly implicated in conscious perception. More
in general, Mack and Rock’s experiments show that subjects tend
to be blind to a critical stimulus that appears either at, or close to,
ﬁxation when they are not searching for it, when they are occu-
pied with a task that engages their attention, and when it is located
outside the boundaries of the area on which attention is directed.
These ﬁndings do not imply that there is no implicit, unconscious
perception, but only that there is no explicit, conscious percep-
tion prior to the engagement of focal attention. Stimuli to which
subjects are inattentionally blind, can be implicitly, unconsciously
perceived. In order to bring them into consciousness, they must
be attentionally processed.
Inattentional blindness (IB) results, however, could be subject
to alternative interpretations involving processes other than atten-
tion, such as expectation and memory (Lavie, 2006a). Firstly, the
critical stimulus is expected in control trials, and subjects are likely
to look for it intentionally: therefore, the comparison of control
and critical trials may confound effects of attention with effects
of expectations. Secondly, while in control trials awareness reports
are made immediately following display presentation, in critical
trials they are made after a task response and a surprise awareness
question in critical trials: therefore, reduced rates of awareness in
critical vs. control trials may reﬂect higher rates of forgetting dur-
ing the longer delay from display presentation until the awareness
question in the critical trials1.
The alternative explanation based on expectation was ruled
out by Cartwright-Finch and Lavie’s (2007) study, which, manip-
ulating perceptual load within Mack and Rock’s (1998) IB para-
digm, compared the rates of IB not so much between the critical
and control trials, as between critical trials of different levels of
load (that is, the critical stimulus was equally task-irrelevant and
equally unexpected across the varying levels of perceptual load).
Cartwright-Finch and Lavie found that the level of perceptual load
in the task determined the rates of IB: whereas subjects were often
aware of the irrelevant stimuli in situations of low load, they failed
to notice the irrelevant stimulus in situations of high load. This
result shows that the level of attention available for the processing
of the task-irrelevant stimulus determines whether the stimulus
can be consciously perceived.
The alternative explanation based on memory is ruled out by
Rensink et al.’s (1997) study, which, unlike the IB paradigm, does
not rely on a retrospective question about an unexpected stimu-
lus: indeed, subjects are instructed in advance that their task is to
detect whether a change occurred between two successive images
and report about it immediately after seeing the images. Rensink
et al. (1997) developed the “change detection ﬂicker task” para-
digm [which is a variant of the change-blindness (CB) paradigm:
see for example Simons and Levin, 1997, 1998]: an original image
A repeatedly alternates with a modiﬁed image A′, with brief blank
ﬁelds placed between successive images; differences between orig-
inal and modiﬁed images are highly visible; subjects freely view
the ﬂickering display and hit a key when they perceive the change.
In order to prevent guessing, subjects are asked to correctly report
the type of change and describe the changing part of the scene.
Because the stimuli are available for long stretches of time and
no eye movements are required, the ﬂicker paradigm provides the
best opportunity possible for an observer to build a representa-
tion conducive to perceiving changes in a scene. The CB found
with the brief-display techniques adopted by previous experimen-
tal paradigms might have been caused by insufﬁcient time to build
an adequate representation of the scene; saccade-contingent CB
might have been caused by disruptions due to eye movements.
1IB results can also be subject to alternative interpretations involving different forms
of consciousness. As we will see, it is possible to distinguish between a “primary”
form of consciousness and a “higher-order, reﬂective” form of consciousness (Bar-
tolomeo, 2008). It can be argued that in IB the subjects are aware of the critical
stimulus (that is, they have a primary consciousness of the critical stimulus), but
are not able to verbalize it (that is, they lack a reﬂective consciousness necessary to
verbally describe the critical stimulus). However, it should be noted that Mack and
Rock, 1998, pp. 197–204) performed some experiments explicitly aimed at verifying
the hypothesis that the subject“has ﬂeetingly perceived the critical stimulus, but fails
to encode it.” The experiments showed that the subjects were not even faintly aware
of the critical stimulus, and that many subjects did not even see a critical stimulus
visible for a total period of 700ms (Mack and Rock, 1998, pp. 202–204), which
contradicts the hypothesis that the subjects were “aware”of the critical stimulus, but
were unable to verbalize it.
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Both of these factors are eliminated in the ﬂicker paradigm, so
that if they are indeed the cause of the difﬁculties, perception of
change should now become easy. But if attention is the key factor, a
different outcomewould be expected.And it is precisely this differ-
ent outcome that Rensink et al.’s study reveals. Their experiments
show that identiﬁcation of changes becomes extremely difﬁcult,
even when changes are large and made repeatedly: under ﬂicker
conditions subjects take a surprisingly long time to perceive large
changes in images of real-world scenes. This difﬁculty is due nei-
ther to a disruption of the information received nor to a disruption
of its storage: it does however depend greatly on attention. The
role of attention is further conﬁrmed by the ﬁndings that: cue-
ing the changing object removes any difﬁculty in detecting change
(Rensink et al., 1997); objects that capture attention, either by
virtue of containing a singleton feature, or by virtue of their sig-
niﬁcant socio-biologicalmeaning, do not suffer fromCB (Ro et al.,
2001); the rate of change detection critically depends on the level
of load in the search task, that is, subjects fail to detect the change
far more often in the condition of high vs. low load in the search
task (Lavie, 2006a,b).
Rensink et al.’s (1997) experiments also answer most of the
criticisms raised by Mole (2008). According to Mole, what Mack
and Rock’s (1998) work shows is only that there are some circum-
stances in which attention is necessary for consciousness: that is,
cases in which the stimulus is presented unexpectedly, for a ﬁfth of
a second, concurrently with something else that one is attending
to, in an unfamiliar experimental paradigm, and followed by a pat-
tern mask. As Rensink et al.’s (1997) experiments show, attention
is also necessary with familiar, and available for long stretches of
time stimuli, when the subject is aware of the kind of stimulus,
and even when the subject is aware of the types of change possible
and is given practice trials before the experiment.
Mole’s (2008) criticisms, however, seem to imply a more gen-
eral kind of criticism based on “some relatively uncontroversial
features of the epistemology of perception.” According to these
considerations from the epistemology of perception, Mack and
Rock’s (1998) and Rensink et al.’s (1997) experiments would not
appear to show that attention is alwaysnecessary for consciousness,
but only that attention is necessarywhenone’s experience is to pro-
vide one with knowledge of the sort probed by the experimenter’s
questions in a CB or IB experiment. In other words, CB and IB
experiments suffer from the defect of not giving the possibility of
independently ascertaining whether attention is always necessary
for consciousness: as they are designed, these experiments would
only reveal that attention is necessary for consciously detecting
changes or unexpected stimuli but not for other cases. According
to this view, a subject who has not attended to the changing item in
the CB pictures or to the unexpected stimuli in the IB experiment,
could theoretically have some kind of conscious experience, but
the experience does not have the “structured content” needed to
provide the subject with knowledge of the fact that the thing is
changing or unexpectedly appearing.
I think that Mole’s (2008) epistemological considerations are
legitimate and that they deserve to be properly addressed. In order
to do so, I will analyze some experiments that either have been
explicitly conceived and designed to prove that there can be con-
sciousness in the absence of attention or have been interpreted
as evidence that attention is not necessary for consciousness. The
analysis will show that even such experiments substantially fail to
prove the thesis that attention is not necessary for consciousness,
and consequently that an answer can also be provided to Mole’s
epistemological considerations (at least until contrary evidence is
offered).
EXPERIMENTS AIMED AT DEMONSTRATING
CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE ABSENCE OF ATTENTION
The idea that attention is necessary for consciousness is not uni-
versally accepted (Umiltà, 1994; Baars, 1997; Hardcastle, 1997;
Lamme, 2003; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2006). A very strong and par-
adigmatic version of the view that attention and consciousness
are distinct phenomena is that held by Koch and Tsuchiya (2006).
They maintain that “top-down attention and consciousness are
distinct phenomena that need not occur together and that can be
manipulated using distinct paradigms” (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2006,
p. 16).
Given the strong position held by Koch and Tsuchiya (2006), I
will start my analysis of the evidence that there can be conscious-
ness in the absence of attention by considering the examples and
arguments they put forward in favor of their hypothesis. To do
so, I will proceed by separately considering some of the perceptual
phenomena and behaviors they have presented as evidence of the
dissociation between attention and consciousness. Additionally, I
will also consider some complementary examples and arguments
proposed by other researchers in support of the view that attention
is not necessary for consciousness.
As my analysis will show, Koch and Tsuchiya’s (2006) view that
consciousness can be dissociated from top-down attention is only
partly true, and needs further speciﬁcation. There are cases of con-
sciousness in the absence of a certain form of top-down attention,
but in the presence of some other form of top-down attention.
There are cases of consciousness in the absence of top-down atten-
tion but in the presence of some other form of attention, such as
bottom-up attention. But there are never cases of consciousness
in complete absence of some form of attention.
Inmyview,Koch andTsuchiya’s (2006) position that conscious-
ness can be dissociated from top-down attentionmainly originates
from a failure to notice the varieties of forms that speciﬁcally top-
down attention and more in general attention and consciousness
can assume.As many authors have highlighted (Bartolomeo, 2008;
Posner,2008; Srinivasan,2008;Koivisto et al., 2009;DeBrigard and
Prinz, 2010; Kouider et al., 2010), in order to correctly understand
the relationship between attention and consciousness, it is essen-
tial to duly take into account the varieties and complexity of forms
of attention and consciousness: overlooking this factormay lead to
the wrong view that there can be consciousness without attention.
Indeed, top-down attention can assume at least two different
forms: focused attention and diffused or distributed attention
(Treisman, 2006; Demeyere and Humphreys, 2007; Srinivasan
et al., 2009; Alvarez, 2011); it can, up to a certain extent, be split
between different perceptual and processing modalities (Pashler,
1998); it can be both widely distributed for relatively long time
periods in a certain location (preparatory attention) and nar-
rowly distributed in another location for shorter periods (selective
attention; La Berge, 1995); it varies according to the perceptual
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Table 1 | A categorization of top-down and bottom-up attention.
Bottom-up attention (= exogenous attention)
Top-down attention (= endogenous attention)
Focused
Low-level (or preliminary)
High-level
Diffused
Low-level (or preliminary)
High-level
load (Lavie, 1995); the total amount of allocated attention can
vary from a minimum, “preliminary” level (Velmans, 1991) up
to a maximum limit deﬁned by the available attentional resources,
according tomotivation and arousal (Kahneman,1973); and soon.
Moreover, forms of attention exist (such as bottom-up) that differ
from top-down attention and which also produce consciousness.
In Table 1, I propose a possible ﬁner categorization of
top-down attention based on the amount of allocated atten-
tion (low-level/high-level) and the spatial extent of attention
(focused/diffused). It is important to note that the distinction
between focused and diffused attention does not imply two sepa-
rate, opposite dimensions but rather, as Srinivasan (2008) suggests,
two ends of a continuum in which the focus varies. The use of
focused vs. diffused attention depends on the speciﬁc task and
motivation (such as tracking a single object vs. multiple objects).
Likewise, the distinction between high- and low-level attention
represents two extremes of a continuum in which the amount
of allocated attentional resources varies. Moreover, as showed by
Kahneman (1973), the total amount of attentional resources that
is allocated, is not constant for every task, but can vary according
to various factors, such as the difﬁculty and novelty of the task,
the arousal level, the expectations, etc. Usually, high-level top-
down attention is used with new, interesting, or complex tasks.
On the contrary, low-level top-down attention may occur with
uninteresting, repetitive, or daily tasks, the secondary task in a
dual-task paradigm when both tasks draw upon the same pool
of resources, and when the stimulus duration does not allow for
top-down attention to be fully deployed.
Similarly, a general awareness of our environment (ambient
awareness) can be distinguished from a more detailed focal aware-
ness of a scene (focal awareness; Iwasaki, 1993); a form of primary
consciousness, including an awareness of the world and mental
images, but not a concept of self, can be distinguished from a form
of higher-order consciousness, including self-awareness, a sense of
time, and language (Edelman, 1989); forms of spatial awareness
can be distinguished from more reﬂective forms of consciousness
based on intellectual acknowledgment (Bartolomeo, 2008); con-
sciousness of sensory qualities differs from volition, which in turn
differs from the simple conscious state,which neurology associates
with the concept of arousal and the diurnal cycle of sleep and wake
(Posner, 2008); an evolutionary primitive form of consciousness,
relatively independent of voluntary attention (anoetic conscious-
ness), can be distinguished from a more recent and complex
form of self-awareness that requires the use voluntary attention
(autonoetic consciousness; Vandekerckhove and Panksepp, 2009);
Table 2 | A classification of consciousness.
(a) Anoetic consciousness (pre-reﬂective affective and sensorial percep-
tual consciousness)
(b) Noetic consciousness (semantic memory, but not yet access to a full
awareness of one’s own ongoing subjective experience)
(c) Autonoetic consciousness (explicit self-awareness)
conscious phenomena can be differently classiﬁed according to the
time scales according to which events are integrated (for exam-
ple, Wittmann, 2011, identiﬁes three levels: functional moment,
experienced moment, and mental presence).
In Table 2, I propose a possible classiﬁcation of conscious-
ness based on Tulving (1985) and Vandekerckhove and Panksepp
(2009).
ATTENTIONAL BLINK
Koch and Tsuchiya (2006) quote Olivers and Nieuwenhuis’ (2005)
study on the attentional blink. The attentional blink (Shapiro et al.,
1994) occurs when subjects view rapid serial visual presentations
of a series of stimuli presented in the same location, usually at rates
of approximately 100ms per item. Subjects have to detect two tar-
get stimuli,T1 andT2;T1 appears ﬁrst and is followedbyT2,which
may appear immediately after T1 or at some other point in the
sequence after T1, with distractors presented between T1 and T2
(that is, the temporal lag between T1 and T2 can vary). The blink
effect refers to a decrement in detection of T2: the basic ﬁnding
is that the decrement is often greatest when T2 occurs not imme-
diately after T1 (position n + 1), but rather somewhere around
positions n + 2 through n + 5 (that is, when there are one or more
distractors between T1 and T2). The performance improves with
a higher lag and reaches asymptote around n + 6 or n + 7. A pos-
sible explanation of the attentional blink is that processing of T1
takes up limited attentional resources: as a result, either access to
these resources is denied for T2 or the representation of T2 is so
vulnerable that it easily suffers from the interference of temporally
surrounding distractors (for a review of the alternative theoretical
accounts of the AB, see Shapiro et al., 1997; Di Lollo et al., 2005).
Olivers andNieuwenhuis’ (2005) study,whichwasmotivated by
the observation that participants in previous experiments reported
rather counterintuitively improved T2 performance when being
somewhat unfocused on the task, shows that the attentional
blink is signiﬁcantly ameliorated when observers are concurrently
engaged in distracting mental activity, such as free-associating on
a task-irrelevant theme or listening to music. The experiment sug-
gests that under conditions of rapid visual presentation, target
detection may beneﬁt from a diffusion of attention.
Koch and Tsuchiya (2006) have interpreted Olivers and
Nieuwenhuis’ (2005) ﬁndings as indicating that top-down atten-
tion and consciousness can oppose each other. However, as Srini-
vasan (2008) argues, there is an alternative interpretation based
on the concept of differential attentional strategy, which is more
economical than Koch and Tsuchiya’s because it does not require
two different processes (one for attention and another for con-
sciousness) to explain the samephenomenon,but only one process
(attention). The alternative interpretation is that under certain
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conditions, such as when subjects know that they need to consider
a large number of items in order to report the second target
stimulus in an experiment on attentional blink, diffused atten-
tion may turn out to be a better strategy than focused attention.
This also corresponds to one of the three explanations that Oliv-
ers and Nieuwenhuis put forward to account for the phenomenon
they found: it may have actually been the additional task itself
that induced a more distributed state of attention. As attention
widened to incorporate the extra task, it may have also widened
temporally and thus included T2 in the series of stimuli.
However, this alternative interpretation does not account for
the overall improvement in T1 performance in the music con-
dition. In fact, diffused attention alone cannot explain how T1
detection performance can also improve as a result of an addi-
tional task. A more reliable interpretation seems to rely not only
on diffused attention, but also on a temporary increase of the allo-
cated attentional resources due to the difﬁculty of the task. This
temporary increase seems to be implied by the two other possible
explanations offered Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2005). According
to the ﬁrst, the effects may be related to arousal: decreased or
increased arousal – as may have occurred in the free-association
and music conditions – may have made the attentional system
more susceptible to other input, including T2. According to the
second, thinking about one’s holiday or listening to music may
have induced a positive affective state,which has shown to improve
performance on several cognitive tasks.
ANIMAL AND GENDER DETECTION IN DUAL-TASK
Koch and Tsuchiya (2006) also quote Li et al.’s (2002) work, which
shows that subjects can rapidly detect animals or vehicles in brieﬂy
presented novel natural scenes while simultaneously performing
another attentionally demanding task, and Reddy et al.’s (2004)
work, which, comparing how subjects perform on a face-gender
discrimination task carried out in the single task condition with
the same task carried out in the dual-task condition with a known
attentional demanding task (ﬁve-letter T/L discrimination), shows
that the face-gender discrimination task can be performed equally
well under the two conditions.
According to Koch and Tsuchiya, 2006, p.19), this kind of
evidence shows that “although it cannot be said with certainty
that observers do not deploy some top-down attention to the
peripheral target in dual-task experiments that require training
and concentration (i.e., high arousal), it seems that subjects can
perform certain discriminations in the near absence of top-down
attention2.”
2 Indeed, it is the very possibility that subjects can deploy some form of attention to
the peripheral stimulus in dual-task experiments, that leads van Boxtel et al., 2010a,
p. 6) to admit that “the major obstacle for solving the question of whether there is
consciousness without attention is that there is no objective psychophysical way to
unambiguously determine a state of ‘complete absence of attention.’ It is not known
whether the conditions measured in the dual-task paradigms are cases of ‘very low
attention’or ‘no attention’ ”See also the observations made by Kouider et al., 2010, p.
304): not only “it seems to be extremely difﬁcult, if not impossible, to assess whether
subjects consciously perceive objects in the periphery without relying on some form
of access,” but also “the possibility of consciousness without attention is usually
based on a restrictive deﬁnition that does not take into account the possibility of
residual attention at lower (i.e. sensory, non-conceptual) levels of processing.”
The view that this kind of evidence shows the independence
of consciousness from attention, has been challenged on various
grounds, even though not all the argumentations seem equally
convincing.
As observed by Taylor and Fragopanagos (2007), in these exper-
iments the subjects underwent up to 10 h of prior training on the
stimuli, which makes it highly plausible that the subjects learnt to
develop an automatic route to respond to the peripheral stimuli to
which they were exposed. However, it should be noted that in their
Experiment 4, Reddy et al. (2004) explicitly controlled whether
there was a confounding effect of training in the face-gender
discrimination task (they tested subjects who had been trained
on a completely different dual-task experiment, that is, natural
scene categorization: animal vs. non-animal or vehicle vs. non-
vehicle),without ﬁnding any signiﬁcant difference in performance
compared with the previous experiments.
Taylor and Fragopanagos (2007) also put forward the hypoth-
esis that the subjects were able to use multiple foci of attention to
detect the presence of both the peripheral target as well as themain
central one (McMains and Somers, 2004). While not completely
improbable, the hypothesis seems however questionable because
it does not explain why the subjects did not improve their per-
formance in the peripheral task by taking advantage of the free
extra-resources made available when asked to ignore the central
task (when the subjects performed the face-gender discrimination
task alone, their performance was not signiﬁcantly different from
performance on this task in the dual-task condition).
I think that to correctly interpret experiments such as Reddy
et al. (2004) one should consider the possibilities of temporary
increasing the amount of allocated attentional resources, and vary-
ing the spatial extension of the focus of attention. Just as for the
case of the attentional blink, it is likely that the highly demanding
task implied by dual-task paradigm induces subjects to adopt dif-
fused attention as a better strategy than focused attention, and
to increase the total amount of allocated attentional resources
(compared to the single task).Moreover, it is known thatmeaning-
ful stimuli such as faces capture exogenous attention. Therefore,
Reddy et al.’s (2004) experiments can be interpreted as a combi-
nation of exogenous attention and increased, diffused top-down
attention.
GIST
Koch and Tsuchiya (2006) observe that we are aware of the gist
of a scene or of our surrounding environment even when we are
not paying attention to it: “In a mere 30ms presentation time, the
gist of a scene can be apprehended. This is insufﬁcient time for
top-down attention to play much of a role. Furthermore, because
gist is a property associated with the entire image, any process that
locally enhances features, such as focal attention, will be of limited
use” (p. 18).
Here, Koch and Tsuchiya (2006) seem to conﬂate top-down
attention with focal attention. As we have seen, top-down atten-
tion canhave two forms: focusedor diffused. Even if focal attention
is absent or nearly absent, one cannot exclude that some form of
diffused attention may be involved, which allows us to capture
the gist of a scene. This is also De Brigard and Prinz’s (2010)
view, who observe that there is no reason to think that attention is
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absent, but rather that it is more plausible to think that attention
is only diminished. Indeed, the view that attention is necessary for
consciousness predicts such ﬁndings very well: when attention is
nearly absent,we are aware of far less thanwhen it is fully deployed.
This is why the gist is perceived and no more.
Alternatively, it is also possible to conceive the phenomenon
of gist reported by Koch and Tsuchiya (2006) as evidence of
the existence of a speciﬁc form of consciousness: which Bar-
tolomeo (2008) calls“primary consciousness.”Primary conscious-
ness refers to the basic condition of being aware of something: as
such, it must be distinguished from a higher-order, reﬂective form
of consciousness, which can involve linguistic abilities and allows
subjects to perceive and describe their own actions and thoughts.
Not always what enters primary consciousness also enters the
higher-order form of reﬂective consciousness: overlooking this
factmay sometimes lead to thewrong observation that the absence
of a verbal report means the absence of consciousness tout court.
Bartolomeo (2008, p. 17) illustrates the difference between the two
forms of consciousness by quoting an example given by Merleau-
Ponty “of someone who enters a room and feels an impression of
disorder, only to later discover that this impression came from a
crooked picture on the wall. Before discovering that, this person’s
consciousness was ‘living things that it could not spell out.’ This
would by no means imply that the ﬁrst impression on entering
the room was unconscious. Rather, the crooked picture gener-
ated a form of consciousness whose source was not immediately
amenable to verbal description.”
The existence of this form of primary consciousness is sup-
ported by ﬁndings such as Landman et al.’s (2003), who show
that people’s memory of a visual image has a large capacity rep-
resentation (more than four items) and remains intact for at least
1200–1500ms after the stimulus has disappeared.
POP-OUT AND THE COCKTAIL PARTY EFFECT
Treisman and Gelade (1980) showed that when subjects search
for a target deﬁned by a conjunction of properties (say a red T)
amongst a number of non-target items or distractors (say, red
Xs and green Ts), search time increases linearly with the number
of distractors. On the contrary, when subjects search for a target
deﬁned by a unique feature (say a red letter among green letters),
search time is independent of the number of distractors. In this
case, the unique feature is said to “pop-out.” The pop-out effect is
sometimes interpreted as evidence of the fact that the unique fea-
ture “automatically” captures attention, in the sense that subjects
can become aware of the target prior to and independently of the
focusing their attention to it.
In my view, this interpretation is wrong because in visual search
experiments subjects are actively looking for the target (Mack and
Rock, 1998). As Most et al., 2005, p. 219) observe: “Although pop-
out search has sometimes been interpreted as evidence that a target
has automatically captured attention (. . .), in a strict sense this
kind of evidence is insufﬁcient to infer automatic attention cap-
ture. Because the observer is actively looking for the target, his or
her attention is presumably broadly and purposefully distributed
throughout the display.”A ﬁrst empirical conﬁrmation of the role
of top-down attention in pop-out was obtained by Hsieh et al.
(2011), who found that top-down attention is necessary for the
subliminal pop-out effect to occur (Experiment 2: unseen feature
singletons do not recruit attention when subjects are distracted by
a rapid sequential visual presentation task while viewing the sub-
liminal pop-out display). Therefore, it seems wrong to consider
the pop-out effect as evidence of consciousness in the absence of
top-down attention.
A related but slightly different phenomenon – the cocktail
party effect – shows more in general that some kind of atten-
tion – whether top-down or bottom-up – is always necessary for
consciousness. Using a dichotic listening task, where subjects who
were presented with two simultaneous messages to both ears via
headphones were asked to attend to the message presented to
one ear and to ignore the other message presented to the other
ear, Moray (1959) found that subjects still recognized their name
when it was presented in the unattended ear (the cocktail party
effect). Cases such as this, where the subject’s name or some other
meaningful stimuli can exogenously capture a subject’s attention
even though the subject does not expect them or have any inten-
tion toward them, do not involve top-down attention (subjects are
asked to focus on one message and ignore the other message) but
rather a form of peripheral, exogenous attention. Indeed, it does
not seem so implausible to think that: (a) evolution has endowed
us with some mechanism that allows us to quickly orient to salient
features of our environment; (b) thismechanism is (at least partly)
basedon theworkingof some formof peripheral, exogenous atten-
tion, which, being constantly applied and distributed, albeit at low
levels of intensity, can be captured when salient stimuli occur.
Umiltà (1994) interprets the cocktail party effect and similar
effects as evidence that attention does not coincidewith conscious-
ness and that they must be considered as independent systems. In
these cases, he argues, the object is perceived consciously in a direct
manner, without the intervention of attention.
Umiltà’s (1994) argument contrasts with what Mack and Rock
(1998) have found. They show that by decreasing the probability
that attention is paid to an object, the probability of perceiving
its presence is reduced. This also applies to cases of captured or
exogenous attention: when the difﬁculty of capture is increased
by reducing the attentional zone or increasing the inhibition of
attention, the probability that one’s own name is reliably per-
ceived decreases (even if it continues to be seen signiﬁcantly more
often than other stimuli). Moreover, as McCormick (1997) has
shown, exogenous cues presented below a subjective threshold of
awareness capture attention without awareness.
These facts (as well as other instances of consciousness pro-
duced by the sole exogenous attention: Chica et al., 2011) indicate
that some kind of attention is always involved in conscious per-
ception. Even objects such as one’s own name cannot be perceived
without the intervention of some form of attention: they must
capture attention to become conscious. There cannot be conscious
perception without attention.
ICONIC MEMORY
Lamme (2003) also proposes that there can be consciousness with-
out attention. In his view, the attentive selection process operates
at a later stage than consciousness: attention does not determine
whether stimuli reach a conscious state, but determines whether a
conscious report about stimuli is possible. In other words, we are
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conscious of many inputs, but without attention this conscious
experience cannot be reported: when we view a visual scene,
we experience a richness of content that goes beyond what we
can report. His model – which presupposes the existence of a
short-lived, vulnerable, and not easily reportable form of visual
experience, which contrasts with a more stable, reportable form
of awareness – parallels: (a) Block’s (1996) proposal of the exis-
tence of two distinct kinds of awareness: phenomenal and access
awareness; and (b) the distinction made in the domain of sensory
memory between “iconic memory” and “working memory.”
In support of his view,he quotes Becker et al.’s (2000) andLand-
man et al.’s (2003) change detection experiments. It is known from
CB experiments that the ability of subjects to detect a change in
a visually presented array of items is greatly reduced if a blank
interstimulus interval (ISI) is inserted between the original array
(stimulus 1) and a subsequent array displaying the same items as
stimulus 1 except for one item that has changed (stimulus 2). It
is also known that change detection improves if the item to be
changed is cued during the display of stimulus 1. The new and
surprising phenomenon found by Becker et al. (2000) and Land-
man et al. (2003) is that change detection also improves when the
location of the change is cued during the blank ISI. This may lead
one to believe that all of the items of stimulus 1 are conscious and
remain in consciousness even after the stimulus is removed, until
it is overwritten by stimulus 2.
According to Lamme (2003), attention is a selection process
that determines not so much whether stimuli reach conscious-
ness, as whether stimuli can go from phenomenal awareness to
access awareness. This model is based on the considerations that:
(i) there are different levels of processing that stimuli can reach.
More speciﬁcally, there are sensory inputs that: (1) reach a
conscious state via the process of attentive selection; (2) do
not reach a conscious state when not attended; (3) do not
reach consciousness, not even when attended;
(ii) these different levels of processing can be more parsimo-
niously explained by a model that is based on an early dis-
tinction between conscious and unconscious stimuli than
by a model that is based on an early distinction between
attended and unattended stimuli. Indeed, while the early dis-
tinction between attended and unattended stimuli would lead
to postulating at least three different processes (one for stim-
uli that are conscious because attended, one for stimuli that
are unconscious because unattended and one for stimuli that
are purely unconscious), the early distinction between con-
scious and unconscious stimuli would lead to postulating only
two processes (one for stimuli that are conscious and one for
stimuli that are unconscious).
Lamme’s (2003) model seems to overlook the fact that both
attention and consciousness can assume a variety of forms. For
example, when he observes that there are “non-attentional selec-
tion mechanisms” that can produce unconscious processing of
stimuli, Lamme does not seem to consider the fact that some
sort of “preliminary attention” (Velmans, 1991) can also exist,
and that preliminary-attended stimuli, despite being processed,
might not be consciously experienced. By overlooking this fact
he mistakes unconscious processing for preliminary-attended
processing. Moreover, as shown by Bahrami et al. (2008), atten-
tion can also act on stimuli that have not reached awareness:
stimulus competition for the allocation of attentional capacity
occurs regardless of whether or not the observer is conscious of
the stimulus representations.
Therefore, it certainly seems to be more plausible and eco-
nomical to propose a model based on the notion that attention
is necessary for consciousness than a model based on the idea
that attention is not necessary for consciousness: while the lat-
ter implies two processes (one for stimuli that are conscious and
one for stimuli that are unconscious), the former needs only one
process (stimuli are attended: various levels and types of attention
are possible).
This latter view is supported by work. Koivisto and Revon-
suo found that “visual awareness negativity” (VAN, which they
consider to be themost reliably and consistently observedERP cor-
relate for subjective visual awareness of a stimulus, vs. a stimulus
that does not enter awareness) and visual awareness are depen-
dent on spatial attention (see also Koivisto et al., 2009). According
to Koivisto and Revonsuo’s, 2010, p. 932), this suggests that iconic
processing is not entirely independent of attention:“the visual icon
has spatial boundaries limited by the scope and boundaries of spa-
tial attention. Outside the boundaries of spatial attention, there is
no visual phenomenology – the spatial boundaries of the visual
icon are the spatial boundaries of momentary visual phenomenal
experiences.”
The ﬁnding that change detection improves when the location
of the change is cued during the blank ISI (Becker et al., 2000), in
my opinion does not show that there can be consciousness with-
out attention; rather, it only conﬁrms that: (a) there is an early
component of attention – namely, the exogenous one (Nakayama
and Mackeben, 1989) – that can capture a speciﬁc item in iconic
memory if sufﬁcient time is afforded (change detection and identi-
ﬁcation tend toworsen at longer ISIs between the offset of stimulus
1 and the onset of the cue); (b) once attention has captured the
item, the item is (or can be) transferred to a short-term-memory
buffer, where it may be compared with a later-occurring item, thus
leading to change detection (change detection and identiﬁcation
tend to improve at longer ISIs between the offset of the cue and
the onset of stimulus 2).
Lamme’s (2003) idea that when we view a visual scene we expe-
rience a richness of content that goes beyond what we can report
was questioned because the CB experiments show that viewers are
over-conﬁdent about their capacities and suffer from an “illusion
of seeing”: when viewing a scene, viewers who claim to perceive
the entire visual scene, actually fail to notice important changes of
the elements of the scene. As argued by O’Regan and Noë (2001),
the “illusion of seeing”might arise because viewers know that they
can, at will, orient attention to any location and obtain informa-
tion from it (for a similar view, see also Dehaene et al., 2006; for an
alternative explanation of the illusion of seeing, see Kouider et al.,
2010).
Despite this criticism, however, I think that Lamme’s (2003)
idea of the “richness of content” is not fully incompatible with an
alternative and equally plausible interpretation of Becker et al.’s
(2000) and Landman et al.’s (2003) ﬁndings, based on the view
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that there cannot be consciousness without attention. According
to this alternative interpretation, the viewer’s initial application of
attention to a presented array of items triggers a “primary” (non-
verbalized), rich form of consciousness (Bartolomeo, 2008) of the
visual scene. Subsequently, the content of the primary conscious-
ness can be verbalized thanks to the deployment, via the cue, of an
additional amount of attention.
EXPERIMENTS AIMED AT DEMONSTRATING ATTENTION IN
THE ABSENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The fact that attention is necessary for consciousness does not
imply that attention generates or can modulate only conscious
phenomena: it can also generate and modulate unconscious ones
(which in turn can inﬂuence or bias both which and how stim-
uli will be subsequently consciously perceived: for a review, see
Merikle et al., 2001). For example, Naccache et al. (2002) demon-
strate that it is possible to elicit unconscious priming in a number-
comparison task, but only if the subject’s temporal attention is
allocated to the time window during which the prime–target
pair is presented: unconscious priming vanishes when tempo-
ral attention is focused away from this time window. Likewise
Montaser-Kousari and Rajimehr (2005) found that attention sub-
liminally modulates and enhances adaptation to illusory lines
in the crowding condition even if the crowded item cannot be
selected attentively for further processing and is not consciously
perceived. Sumner et al. (2006) showed that attention modulates
neural sensorimotor processes that are entirely separate from those
supporting conscious perception. Bahrami et al. (2008) manipu-
lated perceptual load for a task presented at ﬁxation and assessed
orientation speciﬁc adaptation to invisible, peripheral tilted grat-
ings that were irrelevant to the task [peripheral gratings were
rendered invisible by inter-ocular, continuous ﬂash suppression
(CFS)]. They showed that in tasks of low perceptual load any
spare capacity from relevant stimulus processing spills over to the
processing of irrelevant stimuli (producing orientation speciﬁc
adaptation) regardless of whether or not subjects are conscious of
the representations.
The fact that attention can also generate unconscious phenom-
ena is not per se evidence of the fact that there can be top-down
attention without consciousness. As we will see, the view that there
can be top-down attention without consciousness will prove to be
incorrect: actually, there can be top-down attention without con-
sciousness only when the former is low-level (that is, it does not
reach a certain threshold level).However implausible, this view can
originate from either confusing the perception of absence with the
absence of perception or overlooking the existence of the various
forms of attention and consciousness.
Let’s ﬁrst examine some of the examples that were put forward
to support the view that there can be top-down attention with-
out consciousness, and then consider whether there is any kind of
attention that can be dissociated from consciousness.
CONFUSING THE PERCEPTION OF ABSENCE WITH THE ABSENCE OF
PERCEPTION
Koch and Tsuchiya (2006) maintain that top-down attention and
consciousness are dissociated not only because there can be con-
sciousness in the absence of top-down attention, but also because
there can be top-down attention in the absence of consciousness.
They state that “Subjects can attend to a location for many sec-
onds and yet fail to see one or more attributes of an object at that
location” (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2006, p. 17). Likewise, Mack and
Rock, 1998, p. 245) state that “It is not an uncommon experience
to be looking for something or keenly awaiting its appearance in
the absence of perceiving it (. . .). Both the looking for and the
awaiting are part of what we mean by attention in our ordinary
language, but in cases such as these the looking for is not associated
with any perception.”
Generally speaking, I think that when one states that there can
be attention without consciousness or without perception, one
should carefully specify what the expressions “without conscious-
ness” or “without perception” imply. Indeed, there are cases in
which attention can also generate and modulate unconscious phe-
nomena and perceptual illusions. However, when such cases occur
they do not imply that there is no consciousness or perception
at all. Rather, they imply that a person can be aware of something
without being aware of something else,or even that a person can be
aware of not being aware of something. The fact that in some cases
one can focus one’s attention to something without perceiving it
does not imply that one does not perceive anything at all: rather it
means that one perceives something else, or that one perceives the
absence of the thing one is focusing on. As Mole (2008) correctly
observes, cases in which one is on the lookout for something that
does not appear, are not cases of attention without perception;
rather, these are cases where one is perceiving that nothing has
yet occurred. Overlooking this means mistaking the perception of
absence for the absence of perception.
Therefore, in my opinion, experiments such as Montaser-
Kousari and Rajimehr’s (2005) provide evidence not so much of
top-down attention in the absence of consciousness, as of “top-
down attention in the absence of consciousness of something, but
in presence of consciousness of something else,” or of “top-down
attention with consciousness of the absence of something.” Top-
down attention (at least, in its high-level form) always implies
some form of consciousness, even if only consciousness of the
absence of the thing one is focusing on or is looking for. Let’s
consider some phenomena that are usually thought to support
the view that there can be top-down attention in the absence of
consciousness.
Motion-induced blindness
Motion-induced blindness (MIB) is a visual illusion in which
a perceptually salient stationary visual stimulus repeatedly dis-
appears (and subsequently reappears) when superimposed on a
ﬁeld of moving distracters. Target disappearance in MIB is inﬂu-
enced by attention. Schölvinck and Rees (2009) showed (Experi-
ment 1) that directing spatial attention to an MIB target directly
increases its probability of disappearance (compared to an unat-
tended MIB target). Conversely (Experiment 2), increasing the
attentional load in a central task unrelated to MIB (for example,
performing a conjunction-detection task on the stream of stimuli
presented at ﬁxation), decreased the number of disappearances
and reappearances of the MIB target.
According to Schölvinck and Rees (2009), these ﬁndings appear
counterintuitive because, typically, the effect of spatial attention
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is to strengthen the representation of a stimulus, whereas they
found that spatial attention directed to an MIB target increased
the probability of it disappearing. van Boxtel et al. (2010a) inter-
pret these ﬁndings – as well as similar ones – as evidence that the
effects of attention and consciousness can potentially be opposed
to each other: “the more subjects try to see some stimulus by pay-
ing attention to, the less visible it becomes!” (van Boxtel et al.,
2010a, p. 7).
In my view, the fact that paying more attention to the MIB
target increases the probability of its disappearance from con-
sciousness, simply conﬁrms how vision works: the more you look
at something, the more you see. The relevant aspect here is that
that“something” is a visual illusion – MIB – and not what one usu-
ally sees daily (a familiar sight, a common object, etc.): that is, the
content of visual perception is the illusion itself. Contrary to van
Boxtel et al.’s (2010a) interpretation, I think that Schölvinck and
Rees’s (2009) ﬁndings show that themore you look at aMIB target,
the more visible the illusion becomes! In other words, they can be
considered as a case of top-down attention with consciousness of
the absence of something3.
OVERLOOKING THE EXISTENCE OF THE VARIOUS FORMS OF
ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS: BLINDSIGHT
Avery interesting experimentwith a blindsight subject,G.Y.,which
seems to support the view that there can be top-down attention in
the absence of any form consciousness (at least, in the blind area
of the subject), was reported by Kentridge et al. (1999). Blind-
sight subjects are perceptually blind in a certain area of their
visual ﬁeld: they deny having any awareness whatsoever of any
visual stimuli presented in that area, or they acknowledge only
limited awareness of some phenomena within the blind area, such
as movement, but not visual percept. Despite this fact, they are
able to discriminate and localize visual stimuli presented in the
blind area at levels signiﬁcantly above chance. In their experiment,
Kentridge et al. (1999) adopted a cue–target paradigm. A target,
which could appear in one of two possible locations,was presented
to the subject; the target was preceded by a cue which might or
might not indicate the correct locationof the target; the subjectwas
instructed to report – upon hearing an auditory tone that followed
the presentation of the visual cue signaling the probable target
location – whether or not a visual target had accompanied the pre-
sentation of the auditory tone, guessing if necessary, and then to
make a second response indicating whether he had had any expe-
rience whatsoever. Before the start of each experiment the subject
was given instructions indicating the two possible target locations,
and in which location the target was more likely to appear. Two
main different cueing methods were used in the various experi-
ments in order to investigate whether attention and awareness are
inextricably linked or whether there can be endogenous, volun-
tary attention in the absence of awareness: in the central cueing
experiment and in the direct peripheral cueing experiments, the
3 Another example of how it is possible for us to be aware that we are not aware of
something, is provided by the phenomenon of the physiological blindspot, that is,
the fact that a part of the ﬁeld of vision cannot be perceived because of the lack of
light-detecting photoreceptor cells on the optic disc of the retina where the optic
nerve passes through it (see Mole, 2008).
target wasmore likely to appear at the location indicated by the cue
than at the other location; in the indirect peripheral cueing experi-
ments, the target was more likely to appear at the location opposite
to the one indicated by the cue than at the location indicated by the
cue. It is known that indirect cues require voluntary, endogenous
attention as opposed to automatic, exogenous attention: in fact,
the former imply the application of an arbitrary rule (as opposed
to an automatic one) relating the cue and the target location, and
the suppression of automatic, exogenous orienting of attention to
the cue location. Moreover, it is generally maintained that endoge-
nous, voluntary orienting requires conscious awareness (Posner,
1994). Consequently, Kentridge et al. (1999) predicted that if G.Y.
could use the indirect peripheral cue to re-orient his attention, and
yet remain unaware of the cue, they would demonstrate that there
could be endogenous attention in the absence of consciousness.
Indeed, their experiments showed thatwhen an indirect peripheral
cue was used, G.Y. could direct voluntary, endogenous attention
within his blind ﬁeld, despite being unaware of the cue he used
(upon being questioned after each test on whether he had had any
experience whatsoever, he answered that he had had no awareness
of any cues). Therefore,Kentridge et al. (1999) concluded that“the
spatial selection of information by an attentional mechanism and
its entry into conscious experience cannot be one and the same
process.”
I think that Kentridge et al.’s (1999) ﬁndings cannot be straight-
forwardly interpreted as evidence of top-down attention without
consciousness, but rather that they deserve further and more care-
ful examination. In this respect, some alternative interpretations
have been proposed.
According to a ﬁrst alternative interpretation, the fact that G.Y.
verbally reported that he had had no awareness of cues does not
automatically imply that he had had no conscious experience of
anything. As Bartolomeo et al., 2007, p. 157) state: “although an
appropriate verbalization can be considered as a reliable indica-
tor of conscious processing (. . .), the converse is not necessarily
true.” Indeed, it is possible to distinguish, as the phenomenolog-
ical tradition has proposed, between “spoken” and “acted” forms
of perception, that is, between a high-order, reﬂective form of
consciousness, and a primary, direct form of consciousness (Bar-
tolomeo et al., 2007; Bartolomeo, 2008). Evidence of a dissociation
between these two forms of consciousness comes from neuropsy-
chological studies of brain-damaged patients (for example, an
amnesic patient with anosognosia who is able to intellectually
acknowledge the presence of his deﬁcits, as well as his incapac-
ity to directly appreciate them: for a review, see Bartolomeo and
Dalla Barba, 2002; Bartolomeo et al., 2007), and from psycholog-
ical observations (consider for example the case in which people
observing an array of letters for a very short time are aware of
having seen letters but can only name some of them). Therefore,
from this viewpoint, it is plausible to interpret Kentridge et al.’s
(1999) ﬁnding as a case of endogenous attention without reﬂec-
tive (autonoetic) consciousness, but with direct, primary (anoetic)
consciousness.
According to a second alternative interpretation – which inci-
dentally Kentridge et al.’s, 1999, p. 1810) themselves seem to
suggest when they acknowledge that: “it is clear that, while the
direction of attention toward a stimulus may be necessary if it
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is to reach awareness (. . .), attention is not sufﬁcient for aware-
ness,” – the fact that G.Y. could re-orient his attention does not
automatically mean that he could fully take advantage of all the
processes and neural mechanisms entailed and elicited by endoge-
nous attention. According to this view, attention is not so much
a unitary process or entity, as a complex control system, or a set
of coordinated processes; therefore it is possible to explain G.Y.’s
behavior as the result of a partial working of such a complex con-
trol system. This is exactly the kind of explanation of Kentridge
et al.’s (1999) experiments that has been given by Taylor (2008).
According to Taylor, the result of Kentridge et al.’s (1999) exper-
iments can be understood in terms of a corollary discharge and
attention feedback ampliﬁcation of the target stimulus. Thiswould
allow a response to be made through an automatic route from the
partially activated sensory buffer, so as to be more successful than
chance, without any need for the visual buffer to be so strongly
activated as to lead to awareness.
Finally, De Brigard and Prinz (2010) explain Kentridge et al.’s
(1999) ﬁndings by resorting to the distinction between spatial
attention, that is, attention to a region of space, and attentional
modulation of perceptual representations. In their view, in the
case of spatial cueing, a two-stage process occurs: ﬁrstly, attention
is shifted to the region of space indicated by the visual cue, and
secondly, if anything is visible in that space, that thing gets visu-
ally represented and modulated by attention. Only the latter stage
would involve consciousness, not the former. Consequently, a shift
of attention to a regionof unoccupied spacewouldnot result in any
conscious visual percept. InKentridge et al.’s (1999) study,only the
ﬁrst stage could occur, causing G.Y. to attend to a region of space,
but the second stage could not occur because of G.Y.’s lesion in his
primary visual cortex. De Brigard and Prinz (2010) also provide
three possible reasons why the spatial cue could facilitate G.Y.’s
performance: (1) attending to a region of space may lower signal-
detection thresholds for stimuli presented subsequently in that
region; (2) the spatial attention may cause receptive ﬁelds in the
region to expand,with the subsequent increase of neural resources
for the ensuing presented target; (3) spatial attention may prime
the blindsighter for behavior responses in the attended region.
It should be noted, however, that De Brigard and Prinz’s (2010)
explanation could be questioned on the grounds that it seems to
be more suitable for a case involving the automatic, exogenous
orienting of attention (by a direct peripheral cue), than for a case
involving the voluntary, endogenous orienting of attention (by an
indirect peripheral cue).
CAN ANY KIND OF ATTENTION BE DISSOCIATED FROM
CONSCIOUSNESS? ONLY LOW-LEVEL ATTENTION (PRELIMINARY
ATTENTION), BUT NOT HIGH-LEVEL TOP-DOWN ATTENTION
According to Velmans (1991, p. 665), focal-attentive processing
provides the necessary condition for conscious awareness, and
there cannot be consciousness without attention: consciousness
results from focal-attentive processing as a form of output. How-
ever, he afﬁrms that, “in principle, it might be possible to obtain
evidence of focal-attentive processing in the absence of awareness
of what is being processed”: that is, attention and conscious-
ness are not the same thing, and in principle can be dissociated,
because there can be attentional processingwithout consciousness,
even though he recognizes that: “in practice, however, a complete
dissociation of consciousness from focal-attentive processing is
difﬁcult to achieve.”
Velmans (1991) aim is to confute the conventional assump-
tion by psychologists that “preconscious” processing is identi-
cal to “pre-attentive” processing and “conscious” processing is
identical to “focal-attentive” processing. This assumption implies
that “preconscious/pre-attentive” processing is fast, automatic,
involuntary, and restricted to simple, familiar stimuli, whereas
“conscious/focal-attentive” processing is slow, ﬂexible, voluntary,
and subject to intentional control. Velmans’ confutation is based
on evidence that preconscious processing is not inﬂexible and
limited to simple, well-learned stimuli: he provides many exam-
ples of preconscious analysis of novel and complex phrases and
sentences, implicit learning, preconscious selection and choice,
unconscious control of complex, novel motor adjustments, and
unconscious planning. Consequently, it would be misleading for
him to think of the preconscious–unconscious processing of stim-
uli as non-attended or pre-attentive: preconsciously processed
stimuli, being subject to sophisticated, elaborated analysis, receive
attentional resources, although they may not enter conscious-
ness. Moreover, there is evidence (Kahneman and Chajczyk, 1983)
that “involuntary, preconscious” analysis of stimuli is not neces-
sarily effortless, and that it draws on, and competes for, limited
processing resources, which conﬁrms the involvement of atten-
tional resources in preconscious processing (see also Lavie, 1995).
Therefore, rather than speaking of non-attended or pre-attentive
processing (vs. focal-attentive processing), it would be better to
speak of preliminary attention (vs. focal attention; Velmans, 1991.
p. 655).
I think that most of the studies which Velmans cites, aimed at
showing a possible dissociation between focal attention and con-
sciousness,donot show that there can be focal-attentive processing
without consciousness, but rather that preliminary attention and
consciousness can be dissociated. In fact, whether they refer to
dichotic listening tasks and shadowing tasks (Treisman, 1964a,b;
Lackner and Garrett, 1973; MacKay, 1973), visual masking experi-
ments (Marcel, 1980, 1983), Stroop effect, implicit learning (Hart-
man et al., 1987; Nissen and Bullemer, 1987), or control of action,
they all only show that stimuli can be preconsciously processed if
they are given at least a minimal level of attention.
Indeed, as observed by some authors (Neuman, 1984; Holen-
der, 1986; Logan, 1995), in these cases, as well as in others such as
the ﬂanker compatibility effect or negative priming effect (Tipper,
1985), subjects do pay a certain, even if marginal, level of atten-
tion to the to-be-ignored, unwanted stimuli, even though they are
instructed not to pay attention to them, or are prevented from
paying attention to them. This marginal level of attention can be
brought about and maintained in various ways: one of the most
common is bywidely distributing the focus of attention. For exam-
ple,McCormick (1997, p. 178), commenting on his ﬁnding that an
exogenous cue presented below a subjective threshold of awareness
captures attention automatically and without awareness, explicitly
observes that “this ﬁnding and the issue of the automaticity of
exogenous orienting is limited to speciﬁc experimental conditions
(. . .). In my experiments, the observers’ attention was likely dis-
tributed widely over the visual ﬁeld in anticipation of the pending
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cue and target events, thus it could be involuntarily attracted to
the cue.”
For example, the fact that amnesic patients and normal sub-
jects, when exposed to successive exemplars of recurring patterns
of which they were unaware, can implicitly learn those patterns
without spontaneously noting any repeated sequence (Hartman
et al., 1987; Nissen and Bullemer, 1987), does not imply that they
have used their focal attention to learn those patterns: in fact, they
have been instructed to pay attention to the single items compos-
ing each pattern, and not to the recurring pattern. Therefore, it is
inappropriate to afﬁrm that there is focal-attentive processing of a
pattern in the absence of awareness of that pattern, because what
subjects attentively process is not so much the pattern as the sin-
gle items of the pattern. Most probably instead, they were able to
learn the patterns because they spent a marginal amount of their
attentional resources on them: such a marginal amount that they
could not consciously realize what they were doing, even though
it was sufﬁcient to make them learn the patterns.
An author who does not fail to notice that only preliminary
or low-level (but not high-level focal) attention can be disso-
ciated from consciousness is Damasio (1999). In his deﬁnition,
consciousness is the “umbrella term for the mental phenomena
that permit the strange confection of you as observer or knower
of the things observed, of you as owner of thoughts formed in
your perspective, of you as potential agent on the scene” (Dama-
sio, 1999, p. 127). Throughout his work, consciousness is seen as
the main reason for the feeling we have of ourselves as the subject
of our own actions, that is, for the fact that we sense that what we
are doing is done by us, and not by someone else.
In his opinion, some diseases, such as akineticmutism, epileptic
automatism and advanced stages of Alzheimer’s diseases, demon-
strate that there can be ﬂeeting, low-level attention without con-
sciousness. Evidence of the dissociation between low-level atten-
tion and consciousness is given by patients who, while exhibiting
some elementary signs of attention such as the ability to form sen-
sory images of objects and execute accurate movements relative
to those images, do not develop any sense of self, of an individ-
ual organism wishing, considering, wanting, of a person with a
past and a future. Moreover, they do not show any sign of emo-
tion either. Finally, Damasio (1999, p. 91) points out that only a
kind of attention that is high-level, extended in time and focused
on appropriate objects is indicative of consciousness. Despite not
specifying exactly what the difference is between low-level and
high-level attention, these ﬁndings seem to support nonetheless
the hypothesis that high-level focal attention cannot be dissociated
from consciousness.
Summarizing the data provided byVelmans (1991) and Dama-
sio’s (1999) works, we can say that consciousness can be dis-
sociated only from low-level attention (or, as Velmans calls it,
preliminary attention), whether of an endogenous or exoge-
nous kind: high-level top-down attention cannot be dissociated
from consciousness. The determination of the threshold level at
which attention can be dissociated from consciousness is obvi-
ously a matter of empirical investigation. However, in princi-
ple, it cannot be excluded that attention, when applied at near-
threshold, or when not fully deployed because the stimulus dura-
tion does not allow for it, gives rise to unpredictable, paradoxical
phenomena (as it frequently happens in the psychological ﬁeld:
see for example the phenomena of temporal displacement and
continuous displacement described in Vicario, 2005)4.
Afterimage
Experiments in afterimage studies are sometimes used as evidence
that attention and consciousness can be fully dissociated because
they produce opposite effects. For example, van Boxtel et al.’s,
2010b, p. 8886) report some experiments on the formation of
afterimage perception as evidence that “selective attention and
stimulus consciousness have separable effects on perception (. . .)
and, in the context of afterimages,may even have opposite effects.”
In vanBoxtel et al. (2010b), attention and awarenesswere indepen-
dently manipulated during the afterimage induction phase, while
the effects of these manipulations were measured in the afterimage
perception phase. Attention to the afterimage inducer was manip-
ulated by employing an attention-distracting task at ﬁxation (i.e.,
the central task). This task could be easy or hard, ensuring identi-
cal visual input while manipulating the levels of attention available
to the afterimage inducer. The conscious visibility of the inducer
stimulus was manipulated independently of attention by means
of CFS, a form of inter-ocular suppression (i.e., presenting a very
salient object in one eye that completely suppresses the afterim-
age inducer in the other eye). With the suppression present, the
Gabor patch inducing the afterimage was not perceived. This 2 × 2
design allowed for a full-factorial comparison (i.e., high atten-
tion/visible, low attention/visible,high attention/invisible, and low
attention/invisible). According to van Boxtel et al. (2010b), these
data show that paying more attention to the inducer invariably
shortens afterimage duration, while increasing the visibility (i.e.,
consciousness) of the inducer increases afterimage duration vs.
invisibility.
The interpretation of van Boxtel et al.’s (2010b) experiments as
evidence that attention and consciousness can be fully dissociated
is questionable for a couple of reasons at least.
Firstly, CFS is a technique that, physically perturbing the trans-
mission of the information along the way from the stimulus to
the brain, alters the normal processing of visual stimuli. As such,
it cannot be excluded either that top-down attention is not given
sufﬁcient time to be fully deployed and to ﬁnalize its course, or
that, even if top-down attention is fully deployed, only part of
the stimulus is processed. I am not denying that the stimulus is
not processed: empirical evidence clearly shows that the invisible
stimulus is somehow processed in human primary visual cortex
(Bahrami et al., 2007; Watanabe et al., 2011). What I claim is that
the process initiated by top-down attention is partly interrupted
or modiﬁed, and that this does not allow for the stimulus to be
consciously perceived. Therefore, with respect to the stimulus, the
situation can be assimilated to a situation in which there is only
marginal, low-level attention, although one has tried to deploy
high-level top-down attention. As such, the data in the invisi-
ble condition (when the inducer is suppressed by CFS) cannot be
used to support the view that paying more attention to the inducer
decreases the duration of its afterimage.
4 For a commentary of Vicario’s book, see Marchetti (2006).
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Secondly, it could be claimed that the afterimage is the prod-
uct not so much of attending as of consciously perceiving what is
attended. In this view, van Boxtel et al.’s (2010b) ﬁndings would
not show that“attention producesweaker afterimages”; rather they
would show that “attention via consciousness produces weaker
afterimages.” Indeed, it is conceivable that selectively attending to
a stimulus produces conscious perception of the stimulus, which,
in turn, can produce some other (conscious or unconscious) effect
(for example, a decision to search for another stimulus, or to con-
tinue to observe the previous stimulus). In the afterimage case,
this would entail that attending to a Gabor patch ﬁrst produces a
conscious perception of the Gabor patch, which in turn produces
some effect (namely, an afterimage having certain properties, such
as being weaker and shorter than an afterimage produced by an
unattended Gabor patch). Here, the afterimage would be a direct
consequencenot somuchof selectively attending,as of consciously
perceiving the Gabor patch. Without such conscious percep-
tions, afterimages might not possess any of the speciﬁc properties
(namely, the characteristics of being weak and short) they acquire
thanks to conscious processing. Consequently, also van Boxtel et
al.’s statement that selective attention producesweaker afterimages
should be reformulated: selective attention (possibly) produces
weaker afterimages indirectly and via conscious perception of the
attended stimulus.
This interpretation does in fact conﬂict with what the exper-
iments seem to show, i.e., that increasing the visibility (i.e.,
consciousness) of the inducer increases afterimage duration vs.
invisibility. However, it should be noted that the experiments say
nothing about the level of visibility in the visible trials when dif-
ferent levels of attention are paid. That is, they do not measure
whether stimuli are equally or differently visible in the two differ-
ent attentional conditions (low vs. high attention). It might turn
out, for example, thatwhen the inducer stimulus is highly attended,
it is more visible than when the stimulus is not/slightly attended.
After all, strength of afterimages has been shown (Baijal and Srini-
vasan, 2009) to be modulated by the spatial spread of attention
and the speciﬁc attentional strategy (for example, distributed vs.
focal attention) that is adopted to perform the task and yields dif-
ferent types of awareness (for example, background consciousness
vs. object consciousness). As Baijal and Srinivasan’s (2009) exper-
iments show, afterimage duration is signiﬁcantly longer when the
identiﬁcation and counting task is performed with small com-
pared to large letters, local compared to global stimuli, small
compared to local stimuli, and global compared to large stim-
uli. Therefore, until it is determined how the level of visibility in
the visible trials changes with the various levels of attention, it
cannot be completely ruled out that increasing the visibility (via
the increase of the amount of applied attention) produces weaker
afterimages.
ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS ARE NOT THE SAME
THING
The fact that attention is necessary for consciousness and that
high-level top-down attention always implies some form of con-
sciousness does not imply that attention is the same thing as
consciousness.
Firstly, not always does attention generate conscious phenom-
ena. As we have seen, attention can also generate and modulate
unconscious ones (Naccache et al., 2002; Montaser-Kousari and
Rajimehr, 2005; Sumner et al., 2006; Bahrami et al., 2008).
Secondly, as some authors have suggested, consciousness also
needs some other components. For example, according to Srini-
vasan (2008), components such as expectations and capacity of
anticipation are necessary for consciousness: indeed, what IB and
CB experiments seem to show is that when the observers fail to
detect changes this may be due to their expectations of a stable
world and inability to anticipate the stimulus (in the sense that,
for example, observers do not expect people to suddenly change
into someone else). My model of consciousness includes addi-
tional components such as sense-organs, somatosensory organs,
workingmemory, and a schema of self (Marchetti, 2010). It should
be noted, however, that it is always possible to incorporate such
components directly into the attentional system: Knudsen’s (2007)
proposes that attention reﬂects the combined contributions of
four distinct processes: working memory, competitive selection,
top-down sensitivity control, and automatic ﬁltering for salient
stimuli.
Thirdly, attention and consciousness can also be distinguished
from a functional point of view. Consciousness can be described
as resulting from the activity performed by attention (see also Vel-
mans, 1991), and more precisely from the application of attention
to the other organs or to attention itself, and the consequent mod-
ulation of the state of the organ of attention (Marchetti, 2010).
This difference is partly captured by Baars’ (1997, p. 364) descrip-
tion of attention as something more active than consciousness,
and of consciousness as the result of this activity: “It is as if atten-
tion resembles selecting a desired television program, and con-
sciousness is what appears on screen.” The functional distinction
between attention and consciousness has also been highlighted,
but in different terms, by van Boxtel et al. (2010a), who conceive
of selective, focal attention as an analyzer and consciousness as a
synthesizer.
Therefore, my answer to the question of whether there can be
human consciousness at all, as we know it, without sense-organs,
somatosensory organs, working memory, and all the connections
linking one component to the others and to attention, is obviously
no: attention alone is not sufﬁcient and the other components are
also necessary.
CONCLUSION
In this paper,wehave seen that the idea that there canbe conscious-
ness without some form of attention, and high-level top-down
attentionwithout consciousness,originates froma failure to notice
the varieties of forms that top-down attention and consciousness
can assume. Overlooking the fact that both attention and con-
sciousness can assume a variety of forms may lead one to: mistake
the effects of a form of attention for the effects of another form
of attention; ignore that subjects can adopt different attentional
strategies depending on the speciﬁc task they are required to per-
form; fail to notice that different attentional strategies may yield
different types of awareness.
Once the varieties of forms of attention and conscious-
ness are taken into consideration, the necessity of attention for
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consciousness can hardly be denied. As we have seen, there can be
low-level attention or preliminary attention without conscious-
ness, but there cannot be high-level top-down attention with-
out consciousness. High-level top-down attention always implies
some form of consciousness. On the contrary, low-level or prelim-
inary attention can either imply consciousness (such as when the
cocktail party effect occurs) or absence of consciousness. Even if
attention cannot be considered the same thing as consciousness,
some form of attention is always necessary for consciousness.
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